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This paper examines the energy-related behaviour of occupants and owners of multi-
family dwellings in Canada, some of whom do not pay directly for electricity or heat, 
but instead have these costs included in their rent or condo fees.  Using data from the 
2003 Survey of Household Energy Use, we look at the extent to which split incentives 
that result from bill-paying arrangements effect a variety of activities including the 
setting of temperatures at various times of the day and the use of eco-friendly options in 
basic household tasks.  Findings suggest that these split incentives do indeed impact 
some aspects of occupant behaviour, with households who do not pay directly for their 
heat opting for increased thermal comfort and being less sensitive to whether or not 
somebody is at home and the severity of the climate when deciding on temperature 
settings.  Regardless of who pays for utilities, Canadian households who live in multi-
family dwellings are generally unresponsive to fuel prices.   Our empirical results 
suggest that the possibility of environmental benefits from policies aimed at improving 
energy-efficiency in this sector, especially if targeted at reducing the impacts of the 
behaviour of those who do not pay directly for energy use. 
 
Keywords: energy efficiency; agency effects; household behaviour 1.  Introduction  
According to the 2006 census, approximately 43% of private dwellings in 
Canada were multi-family units, a category that encompasses a wide variety of 
configurations including semi-detached houses, row-houses and apartments.  Patterns 
vary considerably across the country, with the lowest concentrations of multi-family 
units (under 25%) found in New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan 
and the highest concentrations (over 45%) in British Columbia, Quebec and Nunavut 
(Statistics Canada, 2006).  In spite of their prevalence in Canada, owners and occupants 
of multi-family dwellings are underrepresented in terms of participation in government-
sponsored energy conservation programs.  For example, multi-family dwellings other 
than apartment buildings (which were not eligible under the program) represented only 
about 10% of EnerGuide for Housing (EGH) participants
i, although they constitute 
about 15% of the Canadian housing market.   
To some extent, the energy-efficiency challenges faced by occupants of multi-
family dwellings are the same as those faced by occupants of single-family detached 
homes.  That is, energy-efficiency will be a function of the types of technologies used 
by the household and their intensities of use.  However, barriers to energy-efficiency 
improvements, beyond those related to eligibility for program participation, can arise 
due to the fact that many occupants of multi-family units are renters, most of whom do 
not select the major appliances that are used by the household, and many of whom have 
the cost of their utilities included in their monthly rental payments.  The latter situation 
also arises for owner-occupants when costs of utilities are included in condominium 
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 fees.  The corresponding agency and asymmetric information problems involved 
complicate the sets of incentives faced by the owners and occupants of these dwellings.   
In this paper, we investigate energy-efficiency related behaviour of residents and 
owners of multi-family dwellings in Canada in order to determine whether or not they 
should be especially targeted for increased participation in energy efficiency programs.  
To this end, we employ data from the 2003 Survey of Household Energy Use (SHEU 
2003).  This survey, conducted by Statistics Canada on behalf of Natural Resources 
Canada, provides data on dwelling characteristics, installed technologies and their 
intensity of use, energy use, and household decisions and demographics for 4551 
Canadian households, 1244 of which resided in semi-detached houses, row houses or 
low-rise apartment buildings.
ii  Our results provide mixed evidence regarding the extent 
of the impact of agency issues on energy-related behaviour.   The reported intensity of 
total energy consumption is significantly higher for households when the heating bill is 
paid by a landlord; and the same holds for electricity consumption when households do 
not pay their own electricity bills.  Much of the energy use data have been imputed by 
the surveyors, however, and therefore may not provide an accurate picture of actual 
behaviour.  A clearer picture of can be obtained by examining temperature settings.  
When a household is not responsible for directly paying for heat, temperatures are set at 
a higher level during daytime hours, and households are less likely to turn down the 
thermostat when a dwelling is unoccupied.  Surprisingly, those who pay directly for 
heat are not responsive to fuel prices, while those who do not pay directly sometimes 
increase temperatures when fuel prices are high.  The influence of agency problems on 
various other aspects of energy-related behavior (building upgrades by owners, 
2 
 engaging in ‘eco-friendly’ practices by occupants) is less pronounced.  Even when 
landlords pay for the electricity or heat used by tenants, dwelling renovation rates 
remain quite low in the rental market.  Although landlords who pay for heat do plan for 
more energy-saving renovations in the near future than their counterparts with tenants 
who pay their own heating bills, the impact is not statistically significant.  Eco-friendly 
behaviour by tenants is affected more by household income than by bill-paying 
arrangements. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we provide an overview of 
the major issues associated with energy use in multi-family dwellings, with an emphasis 
on agency and asymmetric information problems that can arise when occupants are 
tenants and/or do not directly pay their own utility bills.  Section 3 provides a statistical 
overview of the energy-related characteristics and behaviours pertaining to multi-family 
dwellings, their owners, and their occupants from the SHEU 2003 survey.  This is 
followed in Section 4 by a more formal econometric analysis of energy-related 
behaviour related to these dwellings.  Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Energy Efficiency Challenges in Multi-Family Dwellings 
 
As is the case for single-family dwellings, energy efficiency gains achieved by 
households living in multi-family dwellings will be determined to a large extent by the 
types of technologies that are in place and the intensity with which these technologies 
are used.  Households with newer, more energy-efficient technologies have the 
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 capability to heat / cool their dwelling space and perform basic household tasks with 
less purchased energy than other households.   Although lower income households may 
be less likely to own newer technologies, they will also be less likely to own as many 
pieces of energy-using equipment (computers, televisions, dishwashers, etc.).  For 
higher income households, energy bills will constitute a relatively small portion of their 
budgets, and it is hypothesized that they are likely to be less concerned with energy 
costs than lower income households in so far as their energy consumption habits are 
concerned. 
At any given point in time, in both single family and multi-family dwellings, many 
households will not be using the most efficient among currently available technologies.   
The stock of household appliances is only replaced gradually over time as older models 
exit from use and are replaced by newer ones.  And when choosing a new appliance, 
‘first-cost’ purchase price considerations, which tend to be higher for more energy-
efficient models, may dominate future energy savings in the selection process.  Even if 
a highly efficient model is selected, the lower energy costs related to the use of the 
appliance may lead to a standard ‘rebound effect’ of an increased intensity of use ( 
Sorrell and Dimitropoulos, 2008 ).  Furthermore, while the use of energy will in theory 
be affected by current and expected future prices, the extent to which prices affect 
behaviour may be limited given the fact that energy bills are generally received with a 
lag of a month or more, and these bills do not reveal which appliance(s) / household 




 The choice of technologies and their intensity of use can be complicated in multi-
family dwellings by agency problems that arise when either the dwelling is rented or is 
owned with utilities included in monthly ‘condo fees’.  Counihan and Nemtzow (1981) 
were among the first to point out the importance of agency problems in the context of 
tenant-landlord relationships.  They note that in situations where tenants pay their own 
utilities, and therefore the landlord does not benefit directly from reduced energy use, a 
landlord’s major appliance and heating technology purchase decisions will be 
influenced primarily by ‘first-cost’ considerations.  Furthermore, they note that 
legislation, such as that introduced in the US in the late 1970s requiring separate 
electricity metering in new apartment buildings, can inadvertently skew landlords away 
from possibly more efficient technologies such as central heating systems (which may 
be more likely to be properly maintained) and towards the use of, possibly less efficient, 
individual electric heating.    
For tenants who pay their own utilities, given their relative transiency and their 
limited say in the choice of major appliances and heating/cooling technologies, cost-
saving investments in energy efficient technologies will generally be limited to 
‘portable’ technologies (such as electronic equipment and compact fluorescent lighting) 
that tenants can take with them when they move.  Tenants and condominium owners 
who do not pay directly for their own electricity, on the other hand, are unlikely to ever 
see a separate energy bill and may therefore have at best a vague idea of the costs 
associated with their energy consumption habits, providing fewer incentives to invest in 
energy-efficient products or engage in eco-friendly behaviour. 
5 
 The potential agency problems associated with occupants of multi-family dwellings 
can be summarized succinctly into four possible cases, as shown in Table 1 (based on 
American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, 2007).  In Case1, with an owner-
occupied unit where the occupant both chooses the stock of appliances and pays the 
energy bills, there are no agency problems.  Case 2 involves a common landlord-tenant 
situation where an owner’s decisions regarding the selection of appliances and 
heating/cooling equipment to be installed may be driven primarily by purchase price 
(borne by the owner/landlord) and not the operating costs (borne by the 
occupant/tenant).  Since newer more efficient appliances usually come with a higher 
price tag, it would be expected that a landlord will be likely to (i) wait longer to replace 
older appliances; and (ii) select less efficient models when new appliances are installed.  
This efficiency problem may be lessened in areas where vacancy rates are high, since 
landlords may have an incentive to install newer energy-efficient appliances in order to 
improve the attractiveness of their rental properties (Meyer-Rencschhausen, 1983; 
Stoecklein et al, 2005; Volker and Johnson, 2008). 
Case 3 case occurs in landlord-tenant situations where a landlord (owner) both 
chooses the technologies and pays the utility bills.  As the landlord reaps the benefits of 
energy cost savings from the installation of energy-efficient equipment, there will be no 
‘efficiency’ problem.  There will be, however, a potential ‘usage’ problem that arises 
due to the fact that the marginal cost of using appliances and heating / cooling 
technologies is effectively zero for tenants (occupants) who decide on the intensity of 
use of energy-using equipment (Munley et al, 1990; Levinson and Nieman, 2004).  It 
would be expected that tenants who do not pay for utilities would, ceteris paribus, use 
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 more of these seemingly ‘free’ energy inputs. Case 4, possibly the least common in 
practice, occurs in situations where the occupant chooses the technologies but does not 
pay directly for the energy that is used.  This occurs, for example, in owned 
condominiums when utility costs are included in condo fees.  In such a scenario, there 
could be both ‘efficiency’ and ‘usage’ problems as the purchaser of the technology does 
not pay for their use and the agent paying the utility bills does not determine the usage 
patterns. 
Table 1: Agency problems in multi-family dwellings 
  Occupant selects equipment  Owner selects equipment 
Occupant pays the bill  Case 1: no principal‐agent problem  Case 2: efficiency problem 
Owner pays the bill  Case 4: usage and efficiency problem  Case 3: usage problem 
Source: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (2007) 
 
Aside from agency problems, there can also be asymmetric information issues 
associated with landlord-tenant relationships.  When a landlord purchases appliances, 
potential tenants cannot be sure of their energy efficiency characteristics (Meyer-
Renschhausen, 1983; Levinson and Nieman, 2004).  Although new major appliances are 
generally labeled with information regarding their energy-use characteristics, an 
unscrupulous landlord might remove or alter the labels (Murtishaw and Sathaye, 2007).  
Levinson and Nieman suggest that this sort of asymmetric information problem, where 
tenants are unsure about expected utility costs, may provide landlords with an incentive 
to offer to pay the utilities as a signaling device to indicate that a unit truly is energy-
efficient. 
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 These asymmetric information obstacles are in addition to the more general barriers 
associated with gathering sufficient information to make optimal decisions regarding 
the selection of energy-efficient technologies.  Brown (2001) points out that energy 
audits can be useful in this regard.  Volker and Johnson (2008) note that free energy 
audits provided by a Midwestern US utility company were often performed repeatedly 
on the same structure with the same recommendations being made each time.  The 
dwellings where the energy-efficiency retrofits recommended in the (repeated) audits 
were not implemented tended to be those where the occupants had low incomes and/or 
were renters.   
Counihan and Nemtzow (1981) and Meyer-Rencshhausen (1983) note that 
landlords, as investors, consider the purchase of energy-efficiency technologies as one 
of many possible investment strategies.  Therefore, especially for corporate landlords, 
the returns to increasing energy-efficiency in the units that they own will be compared 
to returns on other types of investments.  In jurisdictions with rent-controls, the returns 
to energy-efficiency investments will tend to be lower given that the associated costs 
are less likely to be recouped by the landlord.  Meyer-Rencschhausen finds that 
landlords in Germany are more likely to make energy-efficiency investments when the 
rental units are located close to the landlord’s residence.  In fact, multi-family dwellings 
where the landlord occupies one of the units tend to be better equipped.  Laquatra 
(1992) focuses on rural rental dwellings and finds that different types of landlords 
(large/professional vs. small/family business) face different types of barriers regarding 
investments in energy efficiency improvements.  
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 As far as access to government-sponsored initiatives to increase energy efficiency is 
concerned, this can be more difficult for owners of multi-family dwellings, especially 
when policies have multiple aims (which may include, for example, providing benefits 
that accrue primarily to low-income households).  As was mentioned above, Canada’s 
EnerGuide for Housing program that was in effect at the time of the SHEU survey used 
in our analysis did not apply to apartment buildings.  Another recent example can be 
found in the Weatherization Assistance Program for Low-Income Persons in the U.S.   
To be eligible to participate in this program, owners of multi-family units are required 
to guarantee that the benefits would accrue primarily to low-income tenants.  In cases 
where utility costs are included in the rent this is somewhat problematic since landlords 
receive the pecuniary benefits related to the resulting lower energy costs (although there 
will be health and safety benefits that accrue to tenants).  Other restrictions on landlords 
include guarantees that rents for low-income tenants will not increase as a result of 
expenditures on weatherization and a prohibition against expenditures that would lead 
to ‘undue or excessive enhancement’ of buildings that are weatherized under the 
program. The procedural burdens associated with applying to this particular energy-
efficiency program were reduced after a ruling that deemed that certain buildings that 
fall under a set of assisted or public housing programs automatically meet one or more 
of the restrictions related to the accrual of benefits and rent restrictions on the eligibility 
for participation (US Department of Energy, 2010).  
Previous empirical studies on energy use in multi-family provide evidence of a 
significant ‘usage’ effect in rental units with landlord-paid utilities.  Levinson and 
Nieman (2004) find that renters in the U.S. who do not pay their own utilities tend to 
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 keep their apartments warmer while they are out than those who pay for their own heat.  
This effect is at least partially mitigated by the landlord’s provision of more energy-
efficiency technologies in these apartments.  Evidence of a usage effect is also provided 
in Munley et al (1990) who, using data from the late 1970s, find that in otherwise 
identical blocks of centrally heated apartments (equipped with identical appliances) 
where one half of tenants paid their own electricity bills, those tenants who had their 
electricity costs included in their rent used on average a little over 30% more electricity 
than their counterparts.   Further evidence of efficiency problems is found by Davis 
(2009) who, using a subset of observations from the US 2005 Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey that excludes dwellings with utility–included rental payments, 
finds that owner-occupied dwellings are more likely than rental dwellings to have at 
least one Energy Star product in each appliance category. Finally, a set of case studies 
commissioned by the International Energy Agency estimate the proportion of energy 
use that is subject to split-incentives or other barriers for a variety of sectors 
(refrigerators, water and space heaters, commercial office leasing, vending machines) 
for a number of OECD countries. In many cases it is found that large shares of energy 
use are subject to split-incentives, but the real effect of these barriers on the level of 







 3.  Characteristics of Multi-family Dwellings: SHEU 2003 
 
Before proceeding to an econometric analysis of energy-related decisions in 
Canada’s multi-family dwelling sector, we present some stylized facts from the SHEU 
2003 data set.  Note that buildings constructed before 1920 are excluded from the 
analysis and that although 28% of the households surveyed lived in multi-family 
dwellings, the sampling frame used for the survey did not include any high-rise (> 4 
storey) apartment buildings.  Once we omit observations with missing values 
corresponding to questions regarding the responsibility for the payment of utility bills, 
we are left with a set of 1057 multi-family dwellings which can be divided into two 
main types:  534 low-rise apartments (LRAs) and 523 duplex / double / row / terrace 
type (DDRT) housing units.     
Who pays the bills? 
Information regarding whose responsibility it is to pay utility bills is contained in 
Table 2.  We see that there are a wide variety of arrangements in place.  While it is 
common practice for a landlord to pay natural gas or oil bills, it is less common for a 
landlord to pay for electricity (which is more easily metered on an individual household 
basis).  In approximately 95% of cases where oil or natural gas are used to provide heat 
in a LRA, tenants do not see the bills.  These percentages are much lower in DDRT 
style units where heating and water systems are less likely to be common for the entire 
building and therefore separate billing for fuel is more easily implemented.  This can 
also be seen in terms of the fact that heat and hot water are more likely to be included in 
a tenant’s rent for those residing in LRAs than in DDRT style housing units.  It is not 
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 surprising to see that occupants tend to be responsible for the direct payment of utility 
bills in owner-occupied units.  Almost all owner-occupants pay for electricity directly, 
while owner-occupants in LRA units where natural gas is used are likely to have their 
natural gas costs included in condo fees.  In only one instance did a survey respondent 
residing in an owner-occupied DDRT style unit not pay all of the associated energy 
bills. 
 
Table 2: Responsibility for utility bills in multi-family dwellings* (SHEU 2003) 
PANEL A: Rental units 
Utility bill 
Duplex / Double /Row 
/ Terrace 
(DDRT) 











Electricity 79%  21%  77%  23% 
Natural gas  63%  37%  4%  96% 
Oil 33%  67%  5%  95% 
Purpose 
Space heating  70%  30%  58%  42% 
Hot water   75%  25%  68%  32% 













Electricity 100%  0%  97%  3% 
Natural gas  99%  1%  26%  74% 
Oil 100%  0%  100%  0% 
Purpose 
Space heating  100%  0%  84%  16% 
Hot water   99%  1%  73%  27% 
* all percentages are conditional on energy source / service being in use 
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   Basic Characteristics of Dwellings and their Occupants 
Summary statistics pertaining to basic household and dwelling characteristics for 
DDRTs and LRAs appear in Panels A and B of Table 3, respectively.
iv  While 
apartments tend to be occupied primarily by renters, DDRT-style dwellings in the 
sample have more owner-occupants than renters.  Although not presented in Table 3, 
regional differences exist, with the highest rate of apartment ownership being found in 
B.C. and the lowest rate in the Maritimes.  Larger families with more children tend to 
opt for DDRT units.  Not surprisingly, owner-occupied dwellings have a higher 
proportion of occupants whose incomes are relatively high (above $ 60,000) than rental 
dwellings.  Furthermore, dwellings where the occupant pays all of the energy bills also 
tend to attract higher income households compared to those where landlords pay one or 
more of the energy bills, as lower income households operating on a stricter budget may 
prefer to protected against possible adverse swings in energy costs (Levinson and 
Niemann, 2004).   
According to Counihan and Nemtzow (1983), rented buildings tend to be older and 
less energy efficient.  The age structure of multi-family rental housing units in SHEU 
generally follows a similar pattern.  The majority (over 80%) of multi-family dwellings 
occupied by tenants were constructed between 1950 and 1990, while a large proportion 
(over 70%) of owner-occupied multi-family dwellings were built after 1970.  In Table 
3, we see that, with the exception of occupant-pay LRAs, the average year of 
construction is more recent for owner-occupied dwellings than for renter-occupied 
dwellings. These observations are likely to have repercussions for the amount of energy 
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 consumed by renters relative to owners, since newer buildings are likely to incorporate 
newer technologies and are expected to be more energy efficient.  
Regarding the energy sources used in the dwellings, the information provided in 
Table 3 indicates that nearly 70% of the 534 LRA occupants use electricity for space 
heating, and about 20% use natural gas, with the remainder using heating oil or other 
sources of energy. The patterns are similar across rented and owner-occupied units, with 
a slightly higher rate of natural gas usage in owned units. In owner-occupied DDRT 
dwellings, natural gas is the primary source of heating (54% of dwellings), followed by 
electricity (38%).  In rental DDRT dwellings however, the split is reversed (57% 
electricity, 38% natural gas).  The choice of energy source for water and space heating 
is strongly correlated with the type of heating equipment installed in the building.  
The equipment selected for space and water heating, along with the energy source 
used, often limits the billing options for the utility supplier.  In situations where separate 
metering for each unit is not feasible, such as buildings where central natural gas or oil 
heating systems are used, it will generally be the landlord or condo association who 
pays the corresponding energy bill.  Otherwise, there is an option of making the 
occupant directly responsible for energy costs.   As expected, Table 3 shows marked 
differences in the patterns of fuels used according to the agent who pays the utility bills. 
Buildings where the occupant pays are primarily heated by means of electricity.  This is 
especially predominant in LRAs, where electricity is used for heating in 97% of rental 
dwellings where the tenant pays all bills directly, but in only 43% of dwellings where 
the landlord pays at least one bill.  In cases where the landlord pays for the heat, the fuel 
used is more likely to be natural gas or oil.  This observation is similar for owner-
14 
 occupied LRAs where natural gas is more often used to supply heat to condominiums 
where occupants do not pay for their energy directly compared to units where occupants 
do pay directly.   
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 Table 3:  Summary Statistics for Major Household and Dwelling Characteristics 
PANEL A: DDRT-style units 
   Owned Rented 















Deviation  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation  Mean 
Standard 




Income is more than 
$60000 (in %)  0.46  0.50  1.00.  .  0.24  0.43  0.06  0.25 
Household size  2.85 1.46  3.00  .  2.80 1.38 2.37 1.46 
Proportion of 
household under 18 
years of age  0.18  0.23  0.00  .  0.22  0.26  0.17  0.26 
Dwelling characteristics 
Year of construction   1975 18.56  1994  .  1974 16.54 1969 12.89 
Space heating uses 
electricity (in %)  0.38  0.49  1.00  .  0.65  0.48  0.40  0.49 
Space heating uses 
natural gas (in %)  0.54  0.50  0.00  .  0.35  0.48  0.44  0.50 
N  326 1 133  63 
PANEL B: LRA-style units 
Owned Rented 
 
Occupant pays  
utility bills* 
Utilities included  
in condo fees** 



















Income is more than 
$60000 (in %)  0.36 0.48  0.21  0.42 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.29 
Household  size  2.16 1.08  1.68  0.91 1.99 1.06 1.57 0.91 
Proportion of 
household under 18 
years of age 
0.09 0.18  0.07  0.19 0.10 0.19 0.05 0.16 
Dwelling characteristics 
Year of construction   1973  20.98  1986  11.26  1973  17.41  1971  14.60 
Space heating uses 
electricity (in %)  0.76 0.43  0.57  0.50 0.97 0.18 0.43 0.50 
Space heating uses 
natural gas (in %)  0.13 0.34  0.46  0.51 0.01 0.12 0.37 0.48 
N 63  37  204  230 
* occupant pays all utility bills; 
**occupant not responsible for at least one utility bill;  
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 Effects of split incentives  
The determination of which agent is responsible for paying for utilities is expected 
to have an impact on energy usage and technology choices due to ‘split-incentive’ 
agency and asymmetric information problems (outlined in Section 2).   Below we 
examine the intensity of energy usage, the prevalence of energy-efficient appliances, 
and a variety of energy saving steps and practices that can be undertaken by occupants 
and owners.  Summary statistics are presented in Tables 4 and 5, where shaded cells 
indicate potential instances of agency-related problems. 
Intensity of Energy Use 
Note that actual data on energy consumption for many observations were not 
available due to either (i) the fact that the unit was not individually metered; or (ii) the 
information was not provided by the occupant or owner.  In these cases, values were 
imputed by Statistics Canada based on observed dwelling and household characteristics. 
v  Therefore, although we provide information on the intensity of energy use, these 
statistics should be interpreted with caution.  To the extent that imputed values are 
accurate, there is evidence of potential instances of usage effects in the SHEU 2003 
data.  In LRA buildings, the data suggest that tenants whose landlords pay at least one 
of the energy bills have an intensity of total energy use that is more than twice that of 
their counterparts who pay all of their own bills.  This impact is larger than for rental 
DDRTs where the energy intensity in landlord-pay dwellings is approximately 1.5 times 
that in occupant-pay dwellings.   As far as owner-occupants are concerned, the 
inclusion of utilities in ‘condo fees’ in LRAs is associated with an energy intensity that 
is almost twice of that found for owner-occupants who pay all of their energy bills.
vi  
17 
 When the intensity of electricity use, instead of total energy, is considered, there are no 
cases where those who do not directly pay all of their energy bills exhibit an increased 
intensity of use.   If however, the samples are split based on whether electricity is paid 
by the occupant or is included in rent or condo fees, the expected pattern of higher 




 Table 4 Summary Stats for DDRT-style Dwellings 
   Owned Rented 






















Energy use (Gigajoules per square foot) 
Energy intensity
***   0.07 0.04 0.03  .  0.06 0.04 0.09 0.06 
Electricity intensity
***   0.03 0.03 0.01  .  0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Temperature Settings during Heating Season (°C) 
Daytime Temperature   19.94 2.10 21.00  .  19.55 2.27 20.67 2.14 
Evening Temperature   20.54 1.84 21.00  .  20.21 2.15 20.65 2.12 
Night Temperature   19.30 2.23 21.00  .  18.85 2.44 19.83 2.43 
Temperature varies 
across time of day  0.58  0.49  0.00  .  0.56 0.50 0.40 0.49 
Equipment  
Age of main 
refrigerator 9.38  7.23  10.00  .  8.77 6.14 8.65 5.18 
Age  of  stove  9.91  7.51 10.00  .  10.73 6.56 11.54 7.95 
Age of heating 
equipment  16.17  11.93 10.00  .  16.15 8.99 21.37  12.24 
Age of hot water tank  8.06  6.35  .  .  9.18 6.82 9.06 9.88 
Energy Star® Ratio - 
major  appliances    0.17 0.22 0.00  .  0.11 0.17 0.06 0.14 
Energy Star® Ratio - 
small appliances   0.17  0.27  0.00  .  0.18 0.29 0.14 0.26 
Number of small 
appliances per adult  3.59  1.82  1.33  .  3.68 2.07 3.72 2.56 
Non-environmentally friendly behavior 
Use only 
incandescent  lights 0.15 0.35 0.00  .  0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49 
Use warm or hot 
water for the washing 
machine 0.65  0.48  0.00  .  0.46 0.50 0.64 0.49 
Rinse dishes before 
using dishwasher  0.66  0.48  0.00  .  0.51 0.51 0.57 0.53 
Do not use water 
saving showerhead  0.40  0.49  1.00  .  0.51 0.50 0.55 0.50 
Dry dishes in 
dishwasher  with heat 
on   0.54  0.50  0.00  .  0.47 0.50 0.86 0.38 
Renovations  


















N  326     1     133     63    
* Occupant pays all utility bills; 
**occupant not responsible for at least one utility bill; 
***many values imputed.  
Note: shaded cells indicate instances that are consistent with agency-related efficiency or usage problems. 
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 Table 5: Summary Stats for Low Rise Apartments (LRAs) 
   Owned Rented 






















Energy use (Gigajoules per square foot) 
Energy intensity
***   0.07 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.15 
Electricity 
intensity
***   0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.08 
Temperature Settings during Heating Season (°C) 
Daytime 
Temperature   19.79 2.22 19.24 2.54 19.13 2.13 20.26 2.18 
Evening  Temperature    20.10 2.22 19.97 2.22 19.82 1.98 20.62 2.00 
Night  Temperature    18.70 2.37 18.54 2.57 18.69 2.21 19.39 2.43 
Temperature varies 
across time of day  0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50 
Equipment   
Age of main 
refrigerator  9.63 6.83 9.29 6.08 9.88 6.36  10.40  7.04 
Age of stove  11.84 8.64 10.54 7.61 10.90 6.90 13.46 7.94 
Age of heating 
equipment  18.88 13.51 12.94 8.42 17.53 8.96 18.46  11.57 
Age of hot water tank  7.93 6.72 6.82 3.84 6.77 5.47 8.18 7.43 
Energy Star® Ratio - 
major appliances   0.14 0.22 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.19 0.03 0.12 
Energy Star® Ratio - 
small appliances   0.11 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.25 0.11 0.23 
Number of small 
appliances per adult  3.06 1.51 3.81 1.89 3.37 1.77 3.26 1.75 
Non-environmentally friendly behavior 
Use only 
incandescent lights  0.19 0.40 0.03 0.16 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.50 
Use warm or hot 
water for the washing 
machine 
0.51 0.50 0.69 0.47 0.34 0.48 0.59 0.50 
Rinse dishes before 
using dishwasher  0.68 0.47 0.67 0.48 0.75 0.44 0.75 0.44 
Do not use water 
saving showerhead  0.46 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.49 
Dry dishes in 
dishwasher  with heat 
on  
0.59 0.50 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.50 
Renovations   


















N  63     37     204     230    
* Occupant pays all utility bills; 
**occupant not responsible for at least one utility bill; 
***many values imputed. 
Note: shaded cells indicate instances that are consistent with agency-related efficiency or usage problems. 
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 Temperature Settings and Other Energy-Saving Practices  
Unlike energy use data, which are not always available for individual dwelling 
units, information on temperature settings can be gathered regardless of who pays the 
utility bills
vii.  In both LRA and DDRT rental accommodations, there is a clear pattern 
of tenants opting for higher temperatures (increased thermal comfort) at all times of day 
during the heating season if they are not responsible for the direct payment of all of 
their utility bills.  And in rental DDRT units, those who pay all of their energy bills are 
more likely to vary the temperature during the day.  This likely reflects behaviour 
whereby occupants turn down the temperatures when nobody is at home and/or at night 
in order to save on energy use.  These patterns are not observed in owner-occupied LRA 
dwellings.  
Aside from temperature setting habits, the SHEU survey also gathered information 
on a variety of other aspects of ‘eco-friendly’ behaviour for both occupants and owners.  
For owners, ‘eco-friendly’ energy-saving steps can be made by renovating the basic 
building ‘envelope ’ or updating major technologies such as the heating, ventilation and 
air conditioning (HVAC) infrastructure.  Given the large number of categories 
pertaining to renovations in the SHEU survey, detailed information on these are not 
reported in our tables, except to the extent that some of these will be reflected in the 
average ages of heating equipment and hot water tanks (discussed below).   In general, 
when looking at the percentages of multi-family rental dwellings where various types of 
renovations were undertaken in 2003, no consistent patterns emerge. In many cases, the 
share of dwellings that have undergone renovations is higher when a tenant pays the 
utility bills than when the landlord pays.  There are however some pronounced 
21 
 differences across owned and rented dwellings.  The share of dwellings that have 
undergone renovations is much higher for owned dwellings than for those in the rental 
market. These results suggest that the determinants of home improvements may be 
complex.  Barriers such as difficulties in renovating when tenants are occupying the 
dwelling, access to investment loans for small landlords, and access to government 
incentive programs may play roles in the relatively low rate of renovations in rental 
dwellings.  
The extent of ‘eco-friendly’ behaviour on the part of occupants is captured through 
a series of questions related to lighting and showerhead choices and washing machine 
and dishwasher settings.   From Tables 4 and 5 we see that for each of the categories 
reported, there is a higher instance of occupants undertaking the less energy-efficient 
option when they do not directly pay all of their utility bills in at least one of the 
dwelling types.   And for the use of warm/hot water for the washing machine and the 
use of a water saving showerhead, a consistent pattern is seen for both owner-occupants 
and tenants in all dwelling types:  those who do not pay their own utility bills are less 
likely to choose the more environmentally friendly option. 
 Choice of equipment 
In rental dwellings, bulky ‘major equipment’ such as HVAC systems, water heaters, 
and major household appliances are generally chosen by the landlord and will remain 
attached to the dwelling as tenants move in and out.  Smaller items such as 
entertainment appliances (TVs, DVD players, VCRs, satellite dishes and stereo 
systems) are purchased by the tenant, who will keep them when moving from one 
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 dwelling to another.
 viii  In owned dwellings, occupants are more likely to be the ones 
making the decisions regarding most items, with the exception of centrally provided 
heating and hot water systems. The SHEU survey data regarding the choice of 
equipment, including appliances and HVAC systems, reveal some instances that are 
consistent with what is expected in the presence of agency issues.    
Purchasers of major equipment are expected to select more efficient (newer and/or 
Energy Star®) models if they are also the agent responsible for the payment of the 
associated energy bills.   Under the assumption that heating and hot water technologies 
are not purchased by the occupants in LRAs, results for these technologies that are 
consistent with these expectations are only seen in buildings with owner-occupants.  
When utilities are covered in ‘condo fees’ heating equipment is on average almost 6 
years newer, and hot water tanks a year newer.  In rental units, however, the results are 
the opposite (although the difference in average ages is quite small for heating systems). 
As with heating and hot water equipment, results pertaining to the presence of 
Energy Star® major appliances are consistent with expectations only in owner-occupied 
LRAs.  Under the assumption that owner-occupants can select their own appliances, we 
would expect to (and do) see a higher proportion of Energy Star ® appliances when 
these owners also pay their own utilities.  In LRA and DDRT rental units, where it is 
likely that the landlord has purchased the major appliances, there is on average a lower 
percentage of Energy Star® appliances when utilities are included in the rent.   As far as 
the ages of refrigerators and stoves are concerned, results are also generally opposite to 
what would be expected in the presence of agency problems.  Refrigerators and stoves 
are almost always older on average when selected by the agent who pays the bills (that 
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 is, owner-occupants who pay their own utilities and landlords who include utilities in 
the rent).   One exception is the case of refrigerators in rented DDRTS, but the 
difference in ages is very small.  Another possible exception occurs for stoves in owned 
buildings, if it is the case that these are supplied along with the unit at the time of 
purchase. 
Finally, we consider small household appliances, which are assumed to be 
purchased by the occupant regardless of whether the household is an owner or tenant.  
In all cases we see that the ratio of the number of Energy Star® products to the total is 
higher when the occupant pays the utility bills.  That is, occupants have a greater 
tendency to purchase energy-efficient models when they are responsible for the energy 
costs associated with their operation.  Further evidence of potential instances of usage 
problems can be seen by that fact that in rented DDRTs, there is on average a slightly 
larger number of small appliances per adult in the household when the occupant is not 
responsible for all utility bills.  This same pattern occurs in owner-occupied LRAs, but 
in these units the bills paid by the condo association are more likely to be natural gas 
than electricity, so it may not be reasonable to attribute this behaviour to agency 
problems.    
In summary, there is mixed evidence regarding whether or not agency effects are 
important in the energy-use and technology decisions made by occupants and owners of 
multi-family dwellings in Canada.  To investigate the issue further we next consider a 
set of formal econometric models. 
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 4.  Econometric Models  
 
In this section we present our results from a series of econometric models that 
examine the determinants of temperature settings and ‘eco-friendly’ behaviour in 
Canadian multi-family dwellings.  Temperature settings for the day, evening and night-
time hours are modeled in two ways.  First, we use a standard regression model that 
includes dummy variables for whether or not the occupant pays all of the utility bills 
and for whether or not the dwelling is occupied by an owner or a tenant while 
controlling for other factors.  Second, we consider a model where the determinants of 
temperature setting are allowed to vary across groups, while taking into account sample 
selectivity issues.  Aspects of ‘eco-friendly’ behaviour are modeled using a series of 
Probit regressions. 
Temperature Setting 
Since a substantial number of the energy use observations are imputed, as in 
Levinson and Nieman (2004), we instead focus on the temperature setting habits of 
households.  Separate regressions are considered for daytime, evening and night-time 
settings.  For each time of day, two approaches are considered.  In the first, we consider 
a least squares regression on the pooled data for all households living in multi-family 
dwellings, using a specification that allows temperature settings to vary as a function of 
whether or not the household pays directly for its heat.  Except for price effects, which 
are allowed to vary depending on whether or not the household pays directly for a 
specific fuel, all slopes are constrained to be constant across both groups.   In the second 
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 approach we split the sample based on whether or not the occupant pays directly for 
heat.  For these regressions, Heckman’s two-step selectivity estimation approach is used 
(Heckman, 1976).  
In both approaches, a wide set of control variables are used.  These include a variety 
of building / dwelling unit, household, and location characteristics.   The full set of 
controls can be seen in Table 6. The building / dwelling unit characteristics include 
building age, dwelling type (LRA or DDRT), dwelling size, and information pertaining 
to major appliances and the type of fuel used for the heating system.  It is expected that 
older buildings will in general be less well insulated, and may therefore be more 
difficult to heat, resulting in higher thermostat settings.  The type of building will have 
an impact on the number of outside walls and the presence of heated common areas.  
The choice of heating technology may affect ambient comfort and/or humidity levels in 
a home.  The types of major appliances installed will have an impact on the amount of 
waste heat provided.   The Energy Star ® ratio for major appliances, in addition to 
capturing differences in waste heat may also act as a proxy for the overall energy 
efficiency attitudes of the purchasing agent.  Household characteristics include family 
size, family composition, income, and information on small portable appliances.  The 
family size and composition variables are likely to affect the demand for heat at various 
times of the day.  For example, a family with young children may wish to ensure that 
the younger members are warm at night.  Income levels may influence how often there 
is somebody at home at various times of the day as well as the level of thermal comfort 
that a household can afford.  The appliance and programmable thermostat variables may 
proxy for the general energy ‘attitudes’ of the household. In addition, the location 
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 variables capture the severity of weather during the heating season through the heating 
degree days variable and whether or not the family lives in an urban area.  Finally, we 




 Table 6: Temperature Setting Regressions - Pooled and Selection Models 
(standard errors in parentheses) 




















n.a.  n.a. 
0.621  
(0.411) 
n.a.  n.a. 
0.438  
(0.480) 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































n.a.  n.a. 
‐0.039 
(0.153)   
n.a.  n.a. 
 0.130 
(0.175)   
n.a.  n.a. 


















Other pay*ln(oil price)  ‐0.047 
(0.230) 
n.a.  n.a. 
‐0.009 
(0.218) 
n.a.  n.a. 
 0.071 
(0.264) 
n.a.  n.a. 
Household Characteristics 



























































































































































































































































































R‐square  0.14  0.14  0.23  0.07  0.08  0.17  0.14  0.16  0.22 
Test for overall significance  
(p‐value)
†  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Number of observations   931  722  209  931  772  209  931  722  209 
Mean of dependent 
variable 
19.73  19.57  20.28  20.28  20.20  20.58  19.05  18.94  19.41 
Notes: heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors used throughout; ***, **, *: 




The variables of major interest for the purposes of this study are those related to 
which agent pays for utilities and energy prices.  In the pooled model, we therefore 
include a pair of dummy variables regarding whether or not the occupant pays for heat 
and whether or not the occupant pays for electricity (which is generally needed to 
distribute heat regardless of which fuel is used to generate the heat).   Standard 
economic theory predicts that temperature settings will fall as the cost of heating 
increases, so long as those costs are borne by the agent who is making decisions 
regarding thermal comfort.  The electricity dummy variable is interacted with the 
electricity price variable.  Similarly, the natural gas and oil prices were interacted with 
dummy variables for whether the occupant pays directly for these fuels or they are 
covered in rent or condo fees.  This allows price effects to vary across the group of 
occupants who bear a positive marginal cost of using a particular energy source and the 
group of occupants who do not. 
When the sample is split according to whether or not the occupant pays directly for 
heat, there is no need to include dummy variable and interaction terms pertaining to 
who pays the heat, as separate coefficients are estimated for each group.  There is 
however a possible selectivity issue, as building owners and occupants may ‘self-select’ 
into particular arrangements regarding responsibilities for the payment of utility bills.  
In order to deal with this issue, the regressions for the split sample adjust for sample 
selectivity through the inclusion of an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) term from a reduced 
form Probit regression for whether or not the occupant pays for heat.
x  As in Levinson 
and Niemann (2004), a set of provincial dummies to allow for regional differences in 
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 the general practices regarding lease arrangements is used in the Probit equation to 
allow for identification in the temperature setting regressions.
xi  
The results from both approaches are presented in Table 6.   Many of the results are 
consistent with general expectations.  For example, from the pooled daytime 
temperature setting regression, we find that settings tend to be higher in colder regions 
(more heating degree days) and in households where there is somebody home during 
the day.
xii  Furthermore, in terms of the main focus of our study, we find that those who 
do not pay directly for heat tend to keep their dwellings almost 1⁰ celsius warmer 
during daytime hours.  The magnitude of this effect is basically the same as that 
associated with somebody being home during the day.  None of the price variables 
(including interaction terms), though, are significant.  Temperatures are set at lower 
levels in newer dwellings, possibly due to better insulation or other improved energy 
efficiency features included in more recently constructed buildings.  Settings are also 
lower in dwellings with a higher percentage of major appliances with an Energy Star® 
designation.  Since a higher percentage of energy efficiency equipment in a dwelling 
should lead to less waste heat, the results could be due to this variable acting as a proxy 
for the state of the dwelling in general, including the quality of its thermal envelope.  
Temperatures are set lower when the dwelling is heated by electricity, possibly due to 
the resulting differences in indoor humidity.    There is very little evidence of income 
effects on temperature settings.  Those in the second lowest income bracket seem to 
select the lowest temperature settings.  Households with more small appliances also 
select lower temperatures. Finally, those who use a programmable thermostat tend to set 
lower temperatures during the day compared to those who make adjustments manually.  
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 Continuing with the pooled model, factors affecting evening and night-time 
temperatures differ from those that influence daytime settings.  Evening temperatures 
are the most difficult to explain in terms of available information.  The only 
individually significant variables are the dishwasher and air-conditioning variables.  In 
both cases, the impacts are positive.  Given that dishwashers produce waste heat and 
would therefore tend to decrease the need for a higher temperature setting, a positive 
coefficient suggests that this variable is capturing some sort of attitudinal characteristic.  
Perhaps those with dishwashers have preferences geared towards comfort.  Similarly, 
the positive coefficient on the air-conditioning dummy may reflect preferences that 
favour indoor thermal comfort throughout the year.  Overnight temperatures are 
influenced primarily by household and location characteristics.  Those in colder areas 
and in urban locations choose higher temperature settings, as do larger families.  As 
with daytime settings, those who use programmable thermostats and those with more 
small appliances set lower temperatures.  And, as is the case for evening temperatures, 
those with air-conditioning prefer to have higher night-time temperatures.  Note that in 
the pooled specifications, it is only for the daytime temperature settings that there is 
evidence of an agency effect.  Furthermore, fuel prices are not found to have an impact 
on temperature settings, even for those who pay directly for heat, at any time of day.  
When the sample is split according to who is responsible for paying for heat with 
group-specific slopes for all variables allowing for more flexibility in terms of 
differences in behaviour, we gain additional insight.  For the nighttime regressions with 
the split samples, the IMR variable is significant for the subset of households who do 
not directly pay for their heat, providing evidence of sample selectivity.
xiii  For all times 
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 of day, the sets of significant factors vary across the two groups.  Some of these 
observed differences are consistent with general expectations, while others are not.   
During the day, whether or not somebody is at home during the day only matters for 
those who pay for their own heat.  A plausible interpretation is that those who don’t pay 
for their own heat do not bother to turn down the thermostat if the dwelling is left 
vacant during the day.  For both daytime and nighttime hours, those who pay for their 
heat directly choose higher temperatures in colder areas while those who do not pay do 
not.  That is, those who do not pay for heat are less sensitive to outdoor temperatures 
when deciding on an indoor temperature setting.   Households who do not pay directly 
for heat are also the ones who tend to set the temperature as much as 4⁰ higher in 
buildings that are older than those in our control group (of buildings constructed before 
1930) during both daytime and evening hours, likely to overcome poor insulation, 
whereas households that pay for their energy do not adopt such a habit, possibly 
because they are less willing or able to afford the added comfort or because insulation 
has already been improved.  The patterns of the coefficients across included age groups, 
however, are not completely consistent with expectations given that there is no 
significant effect associated with the newest buildings in the sample for those who do 
not pay directly for heat. 
To the extent that the presence of air-conditioning reflects an increased preference 
for thermal comfort, the finding that it leads to an approximately 1⁰ increase in 
nighttime settings for those who pay for their own heat, but a 2⁰ increase for those who 
do not pay directly further supports the presence of agency effects.  Similarly, to the 
extent that the Energy Star® ratio for major appliances captures the general energy 
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 efficiency and thermal envelope qualities of a dwelling, the fact that only those who pay 
for heat react to this in terms of daytime temperature settings may reflect an increased 
sensitivity of these agents to factors that can save on heating bills.  The opposite pattern, 
however, is found for nighttime temperatures, with those who do not pay directly for 
heat setting lower temperatures in dwellings with a larger Energy Star® ratio.  
There are two significant price effects in the split sample temperature regressions.  
During the day, natural gas prices have a positive impact on temperature settings for the 
group who do not pay for heat directly.  Perhaps there is a psychological impact where 
these occupants take advantage of this seemingly ‘free’ gas that would be more difficult 
to afford if they had to pay for it directly.
xiv  During the evening hours, those who do 
not pay for electricity (in addition to not paying for heat), select higher temperatures, 
even more so if their heat is fueled by electricity.  It is only for this group of occupants 
that electricity prices matter and have effects that are consistent with expectations.  If a 
household does not pay for heat but does pay for the electricity required to distribute 
heat throughout the dwelling area, temperatures are lower.  If, however, the household 
does not pay for electricity, this does not occur.  In fact, similar to the natural gas price 
effect for daytime temperatures, there is a positive price impact (from the sum of the 
two electricity price coefficients) whereby agents take ‘advantage’ of a ‘free’ good that 
they might otherwise not be able to afford.   
Overall, many of the results are consistent with the expectations. The first approach, 
using the pooled sample, suggests that not paying for heat affects daytime temperature 
settings.  A variety of other household and dwelling characteristics also influence 
daytime and nighttime temperature settings, while evening temperatures prove difficult 
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 to model. This suggests that the thermal adjustments that households make occur mostly 
during the day and the night. The analysis of the split samples, the second approach, 
leads to similar general conclusions, as the variables that affect temperature settings 
vary across the two groups in ways that are consistent with the predictions related to 
agency effects.  Furthermore, evening temperatures can be better explained when this 
approach is used, at least for the group that does not pay directly for heat.  Regarding 
price sensitivity, only those households who do not pay for their heat are influenced by 
fuel costs.  Somewhat surprisingly, those who do pay for energy, and hence bear a 
positive marginal cost, do not appear to respond directly to energy prices.   
 
Environmentally (Un)friendly Behaviour of Occupants and Owners 
A variety of aspects of behaviour related to energy and the environment can, in 
theory, be affected by which agent is responsible for paying utility bills in multi-family 
dwellings.  In this section we examine some of these through the use of a series of 
Probit regressions.  Five of these relate to the behaviour of dwelling occupants, and two 
with the behaviour of owners.  In terms of occupant behaviour, the SHEU 2003 data 
include information on whether or not occupants: 
(i)  do not use a water-saving showerhead;  
(ii)  do not use cold water for laundry;  
(iii)  use only incandescent light bulbs; 
(iv)  rinse dishes before using dishwasher (for subset of dwellings 
with a dishwasher);  
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 (v)  dry dishes using ‘heat’ as compared to drying dishes by leaving 
the door open and the heat off (for subset of dwellings with a 
dishwasher).  
The SHEU survey also includes a series questions regarding a wide variety of 
building upgrades that either were undertaken during the survey period or were planned 
for the following year.  Given the large number of categories for possible renovations or 
retrofits, it is not feasible to report on all possible configurations.  Here, we restrict our 
attention to the most general case of whether or not any upgrades were undertaken or 
planned.  
All Probit models were run using the full sample with the inclusion of dummy 
variables to account for bill paying responsibilities.  While it is reasonable to assume 
that occupants and owners self-select into bill-paying arrangements due to strong 
preferences related to thermal comfort and its affordability, it is less obvious that 
households would self-select into bill-paying arrangements in order to engage in the 
types of behaviour studied in this section.  Two versions of each Probit model were run.  
The first included separate dummies for whether another agent (landlord or condo 
association) paid for electricity and heat.  The second used a single dummy for whether 
or not another agent paid for any of the utilities. 
The explanatory variables used in the Probit regressions are the same as those 
used in the temperature regressions (including the dummy variable for whether or not 
somebody is at home during the day and excluding the dishwasher variable for the two 




results are summarized in Table 7 where we report which variables were significant in 
each regression and the direction of the impact.  Note that while the regressions 
regarding owner behaviour have a few individually significant variables, and according 
to an LR test for overall significance are able to explain some of the variation in 
upgrade behaviour, the Probit model barely outperforms a naïve mode for the 2003 
upgrades and is outperformed by a naïve model for the 2004 upgrade regression.
xv  
Therefore, it can be concluded that little if anything can be learned from these 
regressions.  Therefore, we focus on the regressions related to occupant behaviour 
which all outperform the corresponding naïve models.Table 7: Probit Regressions for Occupant and Owner Behaviour  
  Occupant Behaviour  Owner Behaviour 
  Do not use water-
saving showerhead 
Do not use cold 
water for laundry 
Use only 
incandescent bulbs 
Rinse dishes before 
using dishwasher 
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No  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Agency 
effects 
[Yes]  No  [Yes] 
 
No  No  No  No 
 
N  954  728  971  390  387  971  971 








[0.08] (0.07)  0.13  0.17  0.14  0.10  0.09  0.10 
% of correct 
predictions 
[61.9] (61.6)  [67.6] (67.9)  [74.2] (73.3)  [71.0] (72.1)  [62.2] (65.1)  87.1  [87.5] (87.7) 
*significant at 10%; 
**significant at 5%; 
***significant at 1%; []applies only to model with separate ‘other pays for heat and electricity’ 
dummies;  
() applies only to model with single ‘other pays for any utility’ dummy 
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 In the ‘occupant behaviour’ models, many results are robust to whether separate 
heat and electricity bill dummy variables are used or a single dummy variable for 
whether or not any bills are paid by another agent is used.
xvi  Note that in all cases, a 
positive (negative) impact indicates that the household is more likely to engage in the 
less (more) environmentally friendly option.  Higher incomes, for example, whenever 
significant, lead to a higher probability of undertaking the more eco-friendly option.  
This income effect applies to the choice of water temperature when doing laundry, 
rinsing dishes before using the dishwasher, and lighting choices.  The latter may reflect 
‘first cost considerations’, as compact fluorescent bulbs are considerably more 
expensive.  Larger households are more likely to choose a water-saving showerhead, 
but are also more likely to use a dishwasher’s heat option when drying dishes.  Both of 
these make intuitive sense as larger households will use shower water more intensively 
(and are more likely to realize noticeable savings related to hot water conservation) and 
they are more likely to need a quick turnaround in terms of the re-use of dishes.  
Families with children are more likely to rinse dishes before using the dishwasher, 
possibly due to the types of food consumed and/or the state of cleanliness of dishes used 
by children.   
There is also evidence that those who use more energy-efficient appliances or a 
programmable thermostat opt for additional eco-friendly behaviours, as they are more 
likely to use cold water for laundry and use water-saving showerheads, while they are 
less likely to use heat to dry dishes.
xvii  On the other hand, households with more small 
appliances or extra appliances such as dishwashers and freezers, who would presumably 
  39use more electricity, also tend to opt for the more environmentally friendly option in 
terms of the behaviours considered.   
In terms of the main focus of this study, we find limited evidence of eco-friendly 
behaviour being directly influenced by agency factors.  The only two instances relate to 
the use of a water-saving showerhead and the use of energy-efficient lighting.   If 
another agent pays for heating, occupants are more likely to opt for less energy-efficient 
lighting.  This could perhaps be due to a sort of rebound effect whereby money saved 
on heat is used towards the extra electricity costs associated with incandescent lighting.  
For water-saving showerheads, the results are counter-intuitive with only those who do 
not pay for electricity opting for the more energy-efficient option as electricity prices 
rise. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Based on recent household-level Canadian data, we examine problems of 
asymmetric information and agency issues in terms of their effects on energy-related 
decisions of residents and owners of multifamily dwellings.  Such situations occur 
when, through the inclusion of utilities in rental payments or condominium fees, the 
occupant of a dwelling is not responsible for direct payment of some or all of the energy 
bills associated with the dwelling unit and/or does not choose the major appliances to be 
used in the dwelling.  Descriptive statistics suggest that although there are many 
instances in which the differences across the sub-samples of those who do and do not 
  40pay directly for utilities are consistent with agency or asymmetric information effects, 
behaviour is not always in line with what might be expected from economic theory.  
An econometric analysis of (i) temperature settings, and (ii) a variety of ‘eco-
friendly’behaviours allows us to further investigate the ways in which agency effects or 
split incentives manifest themselves in the multi-family dwelling sector.  The strongest 
evidence of agency effects appears in the temperature setting behaviour of households 
who do not pay directly for heat.  These households tend to select higher temperature 
settings, by about 1⁰ Celsius, during the day.  They are also less likely to turn down 
their thermostats if the dwelling is unoccupied during the day or when cold weather is 
less severe.  Furthermore, unlike their counterparts who pay for their own heat, those in 
the oldest buildings set higher temperatures during day and evening hours by as much 
as 3⁰ to 4⁰, possibly to overcome worse insulation.  At night, among those with the 
strongest preferences for year-round thermal comfort, as evidenced by the presence of 
air-conditioning, occupants who do not pay directly for their heat increase their 
temperature settings by about 1⁰ more than those who do pay directly.  There is no 
evidence of detrimental agency effects in terms of the behaviour of dwelling owners, 
but this is likely at least partially due to data limitations, including a lack of information 
regarding the characteristics of building owners. 
  Possibly because heat is considered as a necessity by Canadian households, 
there is little in terms of price or income effects found in the temperature setting 
regressions.  In the rare instances where prices were significant, occurring only for the 
subsample of those who do not pay for heat directly, higher prices were associated with 
higher temperature settings.  This is perhaps due to an attitude whereby occupants take 
  41advantage of what seems to be an unusually good ‘bargain’ in terms of not paying for 
the use of an expensive energy source.  Income, while not mattering for temperature 
setting, does matter for other types of household behaviour, with higher income 
households being more likely to engage in environmentally friendly actions. 
  From a policy perspective, the results point towards possible benefits from 
improving the energy-efficiency of multi-family dwellings.  Dwellings where occupants 
do not pay directly for heat might be especially targeted for improvements related to the 
energy-efficiency of heating technologies and the building’s thermal envelope in order 
to counter-act the temperature-setting behaviour of households in these units.  Given 
that the majority of these households live in rental accommodations, expansion of 
existing programs or the institution of new programs that explicitly target owners of 
rental buildings should be considered.  Another approach could be to promote 
arrangements whereby all occupants pay directly for energy use.  However, efforts to 
provide separate billing for energy costs across tenants of utility-included multifamily 
dwellings may be limited by the technologies in place in existing buildings and could 
result in constraints on fuel choice and overall energy efficiency in new buildings as not 
all technologies readily allow for individual metering.  An additional tack might include 
educational efforts aimed at occupants, indicating perhaps the impact of higher 
temperature settings and other energy-related behaviour on energy use and the 
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i Source: Office of the Energy Efficiency, Natural Resources Canada, EnerGuide for Houses database.  
ii Apartment buildings with more than four floors were excluded from the survey. 
iii Some utility companies, such as Georgia Power in the U.S., offer home energy use calculators, based 
on local climate conditions, that households can use to roughly determine how much various appliances 
and technologies affect their energy use.  See http://c01.apogee.net/calcs/appcalc/?utilityid=gapower (last 
accessed November 30, 2010) 
iv Given the diversity in the sample regarding specific utilities that are included in rents or condo fees, the 
sample can be split in many ways.  Summary statistics calculated according to other possible splits are 
available from the authors upon request. 
v 29% of electricity values, 54% of natural gas values, and 62% of oil values for the 1057 observations 
used in Tables 4 and 5 were imputed. 
vi Given that only 1 of 327 owned DDRT units corresponds to a case where the occupant does not pay all 
utility bills, we do not make any comparisons for this particular subset of the data. 
vii For dwellings in which the occupant does not have control over heat settings (approximately 4% of the 
multi-family dwelling subsample),  temperature settings are not  recorded in SHEU. 
viii While a tenant would not be likely to take an incandescent light bulb when moving, a tenant might 
consider moving more expensive CFL bulbs to a new residence.  
ix Average electricity, natural gas, and heating oil prices by city of residence were provided to the authors 
by the Canadian Building Energy End-use Data and Analysis Centre (CBEEDAC) (www.cbeedac.com) . 
x An alternative model where the selection term was based on whether or not the occupant pays for all of 
the utilities was also considered.  Also, more complicated double selection models were considered, but 
the bivariate Probit required for the first stage did not converge. 
xixi To conserve space, the full Probit results are not reported.  The provincial dummy variables used for 
identification indicate significant differences across regions.  Other factors that are significant at the 5% 
level are ownership, the unit being in an LRA, building age, household size, the fuel used for heating,   46
                                                                                                                                                                              
local electricity and oil prices, the types of major appliances in the dwelling, and the use of a 
programmable thermostat. 
xii The dummy variable for whether or not somebody is at home during the day is excluded from the 
reported evening and night temperature setting regressions, as it would not be expected to influence 
behaviour at other times of day.  If included, the term is always statistically insignificant at other times of 
the day. 
xiii For regressions using the ‘occupant pays’ subsample, the IMR is calculated as -ф(ai)/Ф(ai) and for 
regressions involving the ‘occupant does not pay’ subsample, the IMR is calculated as ф(ai)/[1-Ф(ai)] 
where ф is the normal pdf, Ф is the normal cdf, and ai is the value of the estimated Probit index for the 
corresponding observation.   
xiv While a long-term occupant may expect rents or condo fees to rise in response to a more intensive use 
of heating when prices or high, short-term tenants would be less likely to take future rent / fees into 
consideration. 
xv A naïve model predicts that 0s (1s) for all observations if the majority of actual values in the sample are 
0 (1).  Therefore, for the 2003 upgrade regression a naïve model would predict 0s correctly for 87% of the 
sample and for the 2004 upgrade regression a naïve model would predict 0s correctly for 87.8 of the 
observations.  These results are likely affected by the lack of information on owner characteristics for 
rental properties in the data set. 
xvi Results that only apply to the former are enclosed in square brackets, while results that only apply to 
the latter are enclosed in round brackets. 
xvii To the extent that the full set of environmentally friendly behaviours are jointly determined, 
endogeneity problems may exist in the Probit and temperature regressions.  Unfortunately, the data set 
does not offer much in terms of possible instruments to test for or address these problems. Department of Economics, University of Alberta 
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